BARBIE ET LES TROIS MOUSQUETAIRES - POCHE 9 jA disappointment Flat repetitive often spouting axiomatic explanations ad nauseum and surprisingly narrow minded at times I confess I gave up andust started skimming through the end section Haven t read the whole thing but skimmed the majority of it and read a lot in further depth would love to revisit it again sometime This is the best book in philosophy I have read in a long time I am going to need to read it a few times but read for now Walton s presents an account of the nature of representation He defines representation in the context of his book as fictional representations such as novels films or paintings A representation represents fictional objects and relays fictional facts about them According to Walton representations work by virtue of our practices of make believe This *Is The Same Practice That Child Engage In When They *the same practice that child engage in when they make believe games Such games are composed of prompters they make believe games Such games are composed of prompters principles of generation Prompters are the objects that children will play with in a game There are rules that specify what should be imagined about a prompter when it is used within a game For example if a child is using a banana as a telephone there is a rule that a participant should have an imagining of a telephone when she encounters the banana This rule generates the fictional facts about a fictional object of a representation in this case the banana represents a telephone or the situation of the child playing with the banana may be considered a representation of the situation of an adult operating a telephone In the case of novels films paintings and other paradigmatic fictional representations the art object itself is a prompter and the audience of the art object are participants who intuitively
the rules about the use of the prompter Grasp of these rules enables the presence of the prompter to imaginings in the audience s minds These imaginings constitute the fictional worlds that we associate with artworks For example when I read His Dark Materials the physical book is a prompter and when I engage with it it plus the rules of generation associated with it enable me to undergo imaginings that constitute my phenomenological experiences of meeting all the characters and going alongside with them on their adventures But Walton is not clear whether we should think about the characters and objects that are phenomenally encountered in a fictional work as prompters as well while they are not physical they are associated with rules and elicit imaginingsWhile this premise of the book is very exciting Walton spends all his time elaborating on finer and finer grained distinctions whenever the opportunity opens or on beating a concept to death by applying it over and over again across a series of examples It was not pleasurable to read as a whole For example Walton goes at. Representations in visual arts and in fiction play an important part in our lives and culture Kendall Walton presents here a theory of the nature of representation which illuminates its many varieties and goes a long way toward explaining its importance Drawing analogies to children's make believe activities Walton constructs a theory that addresses a broad range of issues the distinction between fiction and nonfiction how depiction differs from descript.
know the rules about the use of the prompter Grasp of these rules enables the presence of the prompter to
characters ë eBook, PDF or Kindle ePUB ✓ Kendall L. WaltonUt strangely Walton doesn t mention idea let alone pursue it Walton skirts around it when he distinguishes between representing and as kinds of relations that hold between a representational item and an object chapter 2 The Object of Representation There Walton argues that referringdenoting reuires that there be an actual object in the world and the representational item picks it out In contrast representing as a general relation only reuires that encountering that representational item triggers an imagining about fictional properties or propositions regarding some fictional object Moreover representing should not be confused with matching which is understood as a relation between two object that holds on the *basis of the physical resemblances of those objects I found this *of the physical resemblances of those objects I found this be a fertile moment for Walton to argue that the reference based theory of meaning which is so popular in philosophy of language is misguided as a whole and can be replaced by a representational theory generalized from Walton s account of fictional representations For example a starting point for this would be that whenever we think that a word we use refers to a particular object in the world in fact there is a social convention associated with that word that triggers in us an imagining of that object The notion of reference was invented by philosophers when they tried to make sense of this imagining and while the notion of reference can nicely model many cases of imaginings triggered by linguistic expressions it is incomplete and when taken too seriously can generate apparent paradoxes eg the empty referring expression Moreover objects that we think we refer to can t on their own supply semantic value to our sentences Rather it is the significance or meaning of those objects as we encounter them in perceptual experience that might supply semantic value And these perceptual meanings can be understood as especially vivid imaginings triggered by the object as a prompter understood on Walton s modelPerhaps doesn t get these issues because they are not within his scope of interest which anchored on uestions in aesthetics But he mentions in the introduction that he is interested in connecting his ideas to concerns about language in general so this was disappointing I think this book will be of greater interest to readers who care about traditional problems in aesthetics such as Do fictional entities exist Is it possible to have relationships with fictional characters What is the truth value of claims made about fictional characters and objects Walton s book consists of mostly his putting his theory to work in addressing such uestions I guess this book was a bad match for me since I found his theory as having much potential for addressing general uestions about mind and language. Ng of statements referring to them And it leads to striking insights concerning imagination dreams nonliteral uses of language and the status of legends and mythsThroughout Walton applies his theoretical perspective to particular cases; his analysis is illustrated by a rich array of examples drawn from literature painting sculpture theater and film Mimesis as Make Believe is important reading for everyone interested in the workings of representational ar. Length in categorizing all the different *WAYS ARTWORKS AFFORD OUR PARTICIPATION EG *artworks afford our participation eg sorts of emotional responses that are appropriate for an artwork the sorts of actions that are appropriate given the physical medium of the artwork He raises many possible counterexamples to his account
shows why they re misguided I found this tedious and uninformative The sorts of counterexamples he raises seem to be hoc it seems that Walton designs them simply so that he can take them down and provide apparent support for his account The distinctions and categorizations he makes are sometimes interesting but as a whole do not add to his main theory They are ust applications of his theory which do not illuminate any new substantive features of his theory This is a long book than 400 pages Let me summarize my favorite bits from it the only parts that I found worthwhile reading carefully This is chapter 1 Representation and Make Believe and the last third of chapter 7 Psychological Participation At the end of chapter 7 Walton shows that his theory of representation can explain why we find art to be so absorbing and even addictive When we engage with artworks we are not mere observers of the details of those artworks Rather we are participants in the same way that children are participants in their games of make believe We take the rules of the artwork as having normative force over us and we perform the imaginative actions that conform to those rules We have creative leeway in being participants rules are extremely complex and indeterminate and so provide room for us to respond to identify with or elaborate on the characters and elements of fictional worlds I liked this pointIn chapter 1 Walton raises pretty interesting considerations regarding imagination For instance when we voluntarily summon up an imagined image it usually is less vivid than imaginings that come to us spontaneously Moreover imaginings that are triggered by prompters on the basis of rules that are deeply held in our culture perhaps to the extent that we never become aware of these rules but always take them for granted tend to be ever spontaneous and thus vivid For example you and I are on a walk and decide that we ll make believe that any person we encounter is a wizard This imagining follows from a voluntary decision and this rule is not socially conventionalized In contrast the rule that when we see an American flag this triggers the imagining of the concept of America is conventionalized We ll undergo this imagining involuntarily whenever we encounter the flag and so this imagined meaning is ever vivid This suggests that Walton s theory of fictional representation can serve as a general theory of all meaning whether factual or fictional or whether found in our everyday lives or in special recreational activities Ion the notion of points of view in the arts and what it means for one work to be realistic than another He explores the relation between appreciation and criticism the character of emotional reactions to literary and visual representations and what it means to be caught up emotionally in imaginary eventsWalton's theory also provides solutions to the thorny philosophical problems of the existence or ontological standing of fictitious beings and the meani.and shows why they re misguided I found this tedious and uninformative The sorts of counterexamples he raises seem to be